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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: Jos6, a Mexican national, has lived
in the United States since he was five years old and is a lawful permanent
resident.' His wife is a U.S. citizen, as are his four children. The United
States is his home. One day, police catch Jos6 with a small amount of ma-
rijuana, and he is sentenced to twenty days in jail for misdemeanor drug
possession. A year later, Jose is caught with a tablet of Xanax for which he
does not have a prescription. He pleads guilty to a second misdemeanor.
When Jos6 pleaded guilty, he did not know that his second convic-
tion would lead to his deportation. His attorney never warned him of the
harsh penalties built into the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
for those with criminal convictions or the threat those penalties posed to
his immigration status as a lawful permanent resident ("LPR"). Under the
INA,Jose's offense, though a misdemeanor, qualifies as an "aggravated fel-
ony" because it was his second misdemeanor possession offense.
Noncitizens with such drug convictions are often deportable regardless of
how long they have been in the country. When Jos6 went to prison, Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") put an "immigration
detainer" on him-an administrative hold that marked him for deporta-
tion upon completion of his time. Eventually, Jos6 was ordered deported
to Mexico and forced to leave his family behind.
Luckily for Jos6, he was able to appeal his case, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that simple possession of an unauthorized prescription
drug and a sentence of ten days did not constitute an "aggravated felony."4
As a result, Jos6 was not rendered "deportable" under the INA and was
able to remain in the United States. But if Jos6 had been convicted of
something a bit more serious, like possession of marijuana or Xanax with
the intent to sell, his case likely would have gone the other way.
Jos6's case is not unique. The United States incarcerates hundreds of
thousands of noncitizen criminal defendants each year. In 2010, there
1. A lawful permanent resident, also called an "LPR" or "green-card holder," has
permission to remain in the country indefinitely and after several years is typically eligible
to adjust to citizenship. See Immigration and Nationality Act 5 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C.
5 1101(a)(20) (2006).
2. These are the actual facts from Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577,
2580-83 (2010). The rest of the story is a hypothetical account of how the criminal pro-
ceedings that took place before the immigration case might have played out.
3. See id. at 2583.
4. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the aggravated felony provisions under
which the respondent in Carachuri-Rosendo was ordered deported did not apply because he
had only served ten days in jail for simple possession, not "drug trafficking," as the statute
requires. See id. at 2579.
5. Those crimes probably would have been considered "drug trafficking" under the
INA. Drug trafficking is an aggravated felony. Inunigration and Nationality Act
5 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006).
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were about 55,000 "criminal aliens"6 in federal prisons, accounting for
approximately 25 percent of all federal prisoners. In 2009, there were
about 296,000 noncitizens in state and local jails.8 Like Jos6, these defend-
ants usually do not know that their convictions may make them
automatically deportable under the INA.9
Under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky,
criminal defense attorneys have an affirmative duty to give specific, accu-
rate advice to noncitizen clients regarding the deportation risk of
potential pleas.o This rule helps assure that, going forward, noncitizens
will be in a position to make informed plea decisions. Knowing the po-
tential consequences of a conviction, they may choose to go to trial,
risking a longer sentence but possibly avoiding conviction and subsequent
deportation. Unfortunately, for some noncitizen defendants, Padilla was
decided too late; at the time Padilla was announced, they had already
pleaded guilty, relying upon the advice of defense counsel who failed to
advise them of the potential immigration consequences of their convic-
tion. Under what circumstances should relief be available to such
noncitizen defendants?
This Note argues that courts should apply the rule of Padilla v.
Kentucky retroactively on state postconviction review to at least the lim-
ited group of defendants whose cases were on direct review when Padilla
was decided." Part I discusses Padilla in light of the ineffective assistance
of counsel doctrine set forth in Strickland v. Washington.12 Part II traces the
development of the Supreme Court's federal retroactivity jurisprudence
and explains why Padilla probably does not apply retroactively under this
line of cases. Part II then explains why state courts may still fashion a rule
that would allow noncitizens to benefit from retroactive application of
Padilla on postconviction review.
6. "Criminal aliens" are "nloncitizens who are residing in the United States legally
or illegally and are convicted of a crime." U.S. Gov'T AcCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIMINAL
ALIEN STATIsTIcs: INFORMATION ON INCARCERATIONS, ARRESTS, AND COSTS (2011), available
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/316959.pdf. This definition includes not only
undocumented immigrants, but it also includes those who have some form of legal status,
such as legal permanent residency (a "green card"), a visitor visa, etc. Because of the
negative political and social connotations of the term "alien," this Note will use the term
"noncitizen" in place of "alien" except where directly quoting.
7. Id. at 7.
8. See id. at 10.
9. For a list of grounds that make an undocumented person "inadmissible" and
effectively requiring deportation, see Immigration and Nationality Act %§ 237, 212, 8
U.S.C. %5 1182, 1227 (2006).
10. 130 S. Ct. 1473,1486 (2010).
11. Direct review is the initial phase of adjudication and appeal leading to final
judgment. Postconviction review is a form of appeal in which a defendant can challenge
his otherwise final conviction. Procedures for this process vary by state. At the federal level,
postconviction review is called habeas corpus.
12. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Finally, for three reasons, Part III argues that state courts should ap-
ply Padilla in state postconviction proceedings for at least the limited class
of defendants whose cases were on direct review when Padilla was decid-
ed. First, applying Padilla to such defendants is the best way to eliminate
inequity between similarly situated defendants. Second, applying Padilla to
those defendants on direct review at the time Padilla was decided is con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of habeas retroactivity doctrine.
Finally, extending Padilla to this limited class of defendants strikes the ap-
propriate balance between fairness and administrative concerns.
I. PADILLA AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of
counsel in criminal proceedings." Under the Supreme Court's recent rul-
ing in Padilla v. Kentucky, this means criminal defense attorneys have an
affirmative duty to give specific, accurate advice to noncitizen clients re-
garding the deportation risk of potential pleas. 4 This Part situates Padilla
within the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine set forth in Strickland
v. Washington. Section L.A presents the Strickland test for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims. Section II.A discusses Padilla and some of its
potential implications in the Strickland context.
A. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland v.Washington
When a defense attorney's performance falls below the level of per-
formance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a defendant may
challenge his conviction by bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. In most states, defendants may not bring an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on direct review. They may only bring the claim during
postconviction proceedings. If successful, the defendant is granted a new
trial and may re-litigate the original case.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must satisfy the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strick-
land v. Washington." First, the defendant must demonstrate that his defense
attorney's performance was deficient. 6 With a strong presumption of ef-
fectiveness, courts assess whether the attorney's advice was unreasonable
in light of "prevailing professional norms."" Second, the defendant must
demonstrate that his defense attorney's "deficient performance prejudiced
13. Id.
14. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
15. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 688.
the defense."" He must establish a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.""
B. The New Law: Counsel Must Explain Risk of
Deportation to Noncitizens
On March 31, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Ken-
tucky. 20 Jos& Padilla, a native of Honduras, had been a lawful permanent
resident of the United States for forty years when he was caught driving a
tractor-trailer containing a large amount of marijuana.2 ' He pleaded guilty
to drug trafficking but later brought an ineffective assistance of counsel
22claim under Strickland. He argued that his defense counsel made two
major errors. First, his counsel failed to advise him that a drug trafficking
conviction would make him automatically removable under U.S. immi-
gration law.23 Second, his lawyer gave him affirmative misadvice when
she said he "did not have to worry about immigration status since he had
been in the country so long."24 Had he known that this drug trafficking
conviction would make his deportation "virtually mandatory," Mr. Padilla
argued, he would have insisted on going to trial instead of accepting the
plea bargain.25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
failure of Mr. Padilla's counsel to advise him of such adverse immigration
consequences constituted grounds to bring an ineffective assistance of
26
counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment on postconviction review. In
an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court held by a seven to two majority
that to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution, "counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of depor-
tation" that comes with certain guilty pleas. 27 The Court remanded the
case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky to determine whether Mr. Pa-
dilla had suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel's deficient
performance. The opinion did not address whether Padilla would be ef-
fective retroactively.
18. Id. at 687.
19. Id. at 694.
20. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
21. Id. at 1477.
22. Id. at 1476.
23. Id. at 1478.
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1482.
28. Id. at 1487.
FALL 2012] To Plea or Not to Plea 217
Michigan journal of Race & Law
Once a defendant establishes that his counsel's performance was de-
ficient under Padilla and Strickland for failure to advise him of the
immigration consequences of his conviction, he must still overcome a
high bar to show that he suffered prejudice from his defense counsel's
deficient performance.29 Ultimately, a defendant would have to prove that
he would have gone to trial had he known of the potential for deporta-
tion. 0 Where there is strong evidence against the defendant in the
underlying case, this is a particularly heavy burden. Such evidence tends
to support the conclusion that, despite the risk of deportation, taking the
plea was the better option. Furthermore, even if a defendant wins his inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim, he must still re-litigate the original
case.3 1 Still, for many immigrants facing deportation, even a limited option
like this one is worthwhile if it means remaining in the United States, the
country they call home.
II. RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE:WHEN NEW RULES
APPLY TO OLD CASES
Whether a rule applies retroactively hinges on whether a defendant
is on direct review or postconviction review. All Supreme Court rules
apply to defendants whose cases are on direct review when the decision is
announced. 32 For defendants in postconviction proceedings, however, fed-
eral and state rules differ on the matter of retroactive application.3 3
Typically, federal rules do not permit retroactive application of recently-
announced laws to defendants who have already been convicted. But state
courts may choose to broaden the scope of retroactive relief.3 1 In fact,




29. See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Conse-
quences at Guilty Plea, 54 How. L.J. 675, 710 (2011) (explaining the difficulty in
establishing that counsel was deficient because the standard is highly deferential to coun-
sel's decisions).
30. Id. at 711-12. To meet the "prejudice" prong, a defendant must have had a rea-
sonable likelihood that the case would come out differently without counsel's error. It
follows that in a Padilla case, the defendant would have to have a strong enough case to go
to trial instead of taking a plea in order to have experienced prejudice.
31. Postconviction relief generally sets aside the conviction and remands the case to
a lower court to retry the case. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 11.7(e) (3d ed.) (Westlaw).
32. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,322 (1987).
33. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288-89 (2008); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989).
34. See Danforth 552 U.S. at 266.
35. People v. Gutierrez, 954 N.E.2d 365, (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Denisyuk v. State, 30
A.3d 914 (Md. 2011); Commonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 2011); Campos v.
State, 798 N.W2d 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Ramirez, 278 P3d 569 (N.M. Ct.
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Although many states follow the federal retroactivity formulation in
36,their own postconviction proceedings, they are not required to do so.
State courts are only required to provide redress for at least as broad a
range of constitutional violations as federal habeas." The federal rules
function as a floor, not a ceiling.
This Part traces the development of the Supreme Court's federal
retroactivity jurisprudence and explains why Padilla probably does not
apply retroactively under this line of cases. It then explains why state
courts may still fashion a rule that would allow noncitizens to benefit
from retroactive application of Padilla on postconviction review. Section
II.A sets forth the Supreme Court's early retroactivity cases, Linkletter v.
Walker and Griffith v. Kentucky. Section II.B presents the current control-
ling case on federal retroactivity, Teague v. Lane, and explains the
importance of the "new rule" versus "old rule" distinction. Section II.C
explains how Greene v. Fisher, the Court's newest retroactivity decision,
relates to Teague. Section II.D explains why Padilla probably does not ap-
ply retroactively under this line of cases. Section II.E describes how,
despite the state of federal retroactivity jurisprudence, Danforth v. Minneso-
ta permits states to fashion a standard of retroactive relief that would allow
noncitizens the benefit of Padilla on postconviction review.
A. Linkletter v.Walker and Griffith v. Kentucky: New Rules
Apply to Cases on Direct Review
In Linkletter v. Walker, the Court decided that a rule of criminal pro-
cedure should not be applied on federal habeas review to a case in which
the conviction was final before the rule came down." There, the rule of
Mapp v. Ohio, applying the exclusionary rule to the states, was not applied
to the case on habeas review.39 The Linkletter Court set out a three-prong
test to reach its holding: First, the court should look at the purpose of the
rule to be applied retroactively. Second, the court should examine the
reliance of the criminal justice system on the existing rule being replaced.
Finally, the court should consider "the effect on the administration of jus-
tice of a retrospective application" of the rule.40
However, the Linkletter doctrine was applied inconsistently, resulting
in disparate treatment of defendants on direct review. Under Linkletter,
some courts applied new rules while a defendant was on direct review,
App. 2012); People v. Nunez, 917 N.Y.S.2d 806 (N.Y App. Term 2010); Ex parte De Los
Reyes, 350 S.W3d 723 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).
36. See Danforth, 552 U.S. at 266.
37. See id. at 275.
38. 381 U.S. 618,640 (1965).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 636.
41. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,302-03 (1989).
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but others did not. The Court sought to correct this uneven treatment in
Griffith v. Kentucky, holding that all new rules would apply to defendants
42
on direct review. Griffith adopted the view formerly proposed by Justice
Harlan in his oft-cited dissenting opinions in Desist v. United States and
Mackey v. United States.43 In justice Harlan's view, the purpose of habeas is
to review constitutional defects in criminal proceedings in order to pro-
tect defendants from harmful error of conviction and the consequences
that folloW 44
The Griffith Court explicitly adopted the principles described by
Justice Harlan in Mackey and Desist, articulating two reasons why it found
his approach persuasive. 45 First, following Justice Harlan's rationale in
Mackey, the Griffith Court found that the nature of judicial review re-
quires a consistent application of rules. 46 In Mackey, Justice Harlan
explained, "[i]f we do not resolve all cases before us on direct review in
light of our best understanding of governing constitutional principles, it is
difficult to see why we should so adjudicate any case at all." 47 The Griffith
Court agreed that all similar cases pending on direct review should be
adjudicated under the same rules in order to conform to norms of consti-
tutional adjudication.48
Second, the Griffith Court held that unacceptable inequity would
result between similarly situated defendants if rules were to be applied
only to some defendants and not to others.4 9 The Court cannot create the
broad rules a legislature can; it can only evaluate individual issues in rela-
tion to the laws drawn by Congress.o Thus, if a new rule was not applied
to all pending cases on direct review, the Court's decision announcing
that rule would have the effect of favoring that defendant's case while
failing to resolve similar cases under the prevailing constitutional standards
at the time of their conviction. Justice Harlan denounced a system that
would allow "simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review,
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and
then permitting a stream of similar cases to subsequently flow by unaf-
42. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
43. Id. at 322; also see Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions in Desist v United States,
394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) and Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971).
44. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Such rights can be protected by those procedures "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty.") (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
45. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 ("In Justice Harlan's view, and now in ours, failure to
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review vio-
lates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.").
46. Id. at 323.
47. Mackey, 401 US. at 679.
48. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
49. Id. at 323.
50. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969); Grifith, 479 U.S. at 323.
220 [VOL. 18:213
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fected by that new rule."" Thus, Grifith held that all newly announced
rules would be applied to defendants on direct review, whether they rep-
resented a new rule that shows a "clear break with the past," or an old
rule.52
B. Teague v. Lane: Federal Retroactivity on Habeas Review
Although Griffith clearly settled that new constitutional rules always
apply on direct review, it left open the question of whether new rules may
apply retroactively on postconviction review. Two years after Griffith, the
Court determined in Teague v. Lane that new constitutional rules should not
be applied on federal habeas review when a defendant is appealing a final
conviction. 53Just as the Linkletter standard had led to inconsistencies on di-
rect review, so had it caused discrepancies on postconviction review.54
Under Teague, the Court's first inquiry when determining retroactivity on
postconviction review is whether the rule is a "new rule" or an "old rule."5s
A rule is "new" when "it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation
on the States or the Federal Government . .. to put it differently, a case
announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final."56 If a rule is new, the
Court must proceed to the next stage of the analysis, namely whether the
rule fits into one of the two exceptions to nonretroactivity. If a rule is old,
then the retroactivity analysis is unnecessary because the court should
have applied the rule already. Only an old rule can apply on postconvic-
tion review unless it meets once of the two exceptions.
In making this decision, the Court again relied on Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in Desist, where he wrote that it is "sounder, in adjudi-
cating habeas petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a
conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on
" 57the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation. This set
the general rule of nonretroactivity on postconviction review.
Continuing with Justice Harlan's reasoning, the Teague Court held
that there are only two exceptions to the general nonretroactivity rule for
new rules. First, new substantive rules always apply to defendants on
postconviction review. A substantive rule is described by Justice Harlan
as a rule placing "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
51. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679.
52. Griffith, 479 US. at 328.
53. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
54. Id. at 305.
55. Id. at 301.
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 306 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 689 (1969)).
58. Id. at 307.
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beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe." 9
This exception applies to situations where conduct was formerly punisha-
ble, but has now been decriminalized.6
Secondly, constitutional rights of procedure also apply to defendants
on postconviction review. Such rights are those that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,"6 ' described by the Teague court as "watershed
rules of criminal procedure."62 This is a very high standard. The procedural
rule must be so essential to determining the guilt or innocence of a party
under the democratic regime of our Constitution that it must be made
63
available to all defendants, regardless of the finality of their convictions.
Thus far, the Court has recognized only the rule of Gideon v. Wainwright,
establishing the right to state-appointed counsel for indigent criminal de-
64
fendants, as fitting into this Teague exception.
C. A Caveat to Retroactivity on Direct and Habeas: Greene v. Fisher
In November 2011, the Supreme Court decided Greene v. Fisher,
which added a wrinkle to Teague's doctrine that most new rules should
not be applied to a case after the defendant has exhausted his appeals and
his conviction has become final.6 ' Greene states that a defendant may have
the benefit of a "new" rule announced while he is on direct review so
long as it comes down before the final decision on the merits. In the case,
the defendant appealed a decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
light of a relevant new rule regarding habeas claims under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) decided only three
months after his last decision on the merits.
Under AEDPA, there is a statutory rule of retroactivity related to the
Teague jurisprudence which forbids a federal court from granting habeas
relief to a state prisoner "with respect to any claim that has been adjudi-
cated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the [state-court
adjudication] ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to . .. clearly es-
tablished Federal law."6 The Court considered the question of whether
"clearly established Federal law" includes decisions of the Supreme Court
59. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971).
60. Eve Brensike Primus, Supplement on Retroactivity 2 (2011) (on file with au-
thor). For example, the ban on interracial marriage once criminalized marriage between a
White person and a person of another race but was struck down as unconstitutional in
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
62. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
63. Id.
64. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
65. 132 S. Ct. 38, 42 (2011).
66. Id. at 42-43.
67. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(d)(1) (2006)).
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that come down after the last state-court adjudication on the merits of
the case but before the defendant's conviction becomes final. In other
words, the Court needed to decide whether a "new" rule should apply to
a defendant when it comes down at any point on direct review, as Griffith
would suggest, or only when it comes down before the last decision of
any court on the merits.
In Greene, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that inquiries about
retroactivity under AEDPA must be distinct from those under Teague."
He stated that AEDPA did not adopt Teague, and thus, federal habeas
would not be available to petitioners who wish to seek relief under a rule
that was announced after their most recent adjudication on the merits.70
However, Justice Scalia did suggest that in cases like the petitioner's, when
a favorable new rule is announced such a short time after the last decision
on the merits, then the petitioner is advised to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court." Such a petition, he said, would be like-
ly to produce an order granting the petition, vacating the judgment below,
and remanding the case.72 Alternatively, a defendant in such a situation
could assert his claim under the new rule on postconviction proceed-
ings." The Court has yet to decide whether AEDPA incorporated
Teague's two exceptions, so this remains an open question.74
Thus, when federal courts are determining whether they must apply
a rule retroactively, they first analyze whether the rule is "new" or "old." If
the rule is old, it must be applied at every stage. If it is new, Greene says the
rule must be applied on direct review regardless of whether it existed at
the last ruling on the merits, and on postconviction review only if it ex-
isted before the last ruling on the merits." Teague says a new rule must not
be applied on postconviction review unless it fits into one of two excep-
tions: (1) it is a substantive rule; or (2) it is "watershed," i.e., Gideon. This is
the blueprint that federal courts must follow on federal habeas to deter-
mine if Padilla may apply retroactively. However, States are not
constrained to this formula for application of rules during state postcon-
* * -76viction proceedings.
68. Id. The "last decision on the merits" rule does not include appeals without
opinions or procedural decisions. Thus, when challenging a conviction under AEDPA, a
defendant may not be able to get the benefit of a rule that came down on direct appeal if,
for example, it was decided after his trial but before his appeal that was confirmed without
opinion.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 45.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 44.
75. Id. at 42.
76. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 264, 288-89 (2008).
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D. Why Teague Likely Prevents Padilla on Federal Habeas
Following the line of reasoning from Teague, noncitizens convicted
of criminal offenses who were not informed of their probable deporta-
tions will likely not have the benefit of the Padilla rule on federal habeas
review because it will be considered a new rule. Those who were on di-
rect review in majority rule states will also not have the benefit of Padilla,
since they cannot bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim until
postconviction.7 ' But defendants who were on direct review in minority
states will be able to use Padilla, as will all those who enter the criminal
justice system post-Padilla. The rationale that new judicial decisions
should be applied on habeas in order to fairly treat defendants who were
similarly situated on direct review could theoretically lead to application
of the Padilla rule on federal habeas. The interplay of the Teague and
Greene doctrines described above, however, means that it is unlikely that
relief will be granted under this rule.
After Padilla was decided, federal and state prisoners who had re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel because they had not been advised
of immigration consequences, but who had already exhausted their state-
level remedies, began to bring their claims on federal habeas. On federal
habeas, the question ultimately comes down to "whether Padilla escapes
characterization as a 'new' rule, and if it does not, whether it fits within
one of the Teague exceptions" described above.8 o Thus, defense attorneys
argue that Padilla is simply an application of Strickland and therefore an
"old rule," while prosecutors argue that Padilla is a "new rule." The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari on April 30, 2012, in Chaidez v. United
States, discussed below, to decide this very question.
Two federal circuit courts have held that Padilla does promulgate a
new rule-denying habeas relief 2-while one has held that Padilla does
apply retroactively. In Chaidez, which the Supreme Court will hear in the
Fall 2012 term, the Seventh Circuit held that Padilla is a new rule because
77. "Majority rule states" refers to those states in which ineffective assistance of
counsel claims may only be brought on postconviction review rather than on direct re-
view.
78. Under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a defendant can bring a claim with
any new rule only on postconviction review. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011), created
a small window of time within direct review, after the last decision on the merits but be-
fore the appeals have been exhausted and a final conviction entered that would allow a
defendant to submit a claim using that rule before postconviction review.
79. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 28.6(a).
80. Id.
81. 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012) (granting writ of certiorari).
82. United States v. Chang Hong, 671 E3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2011); Chaidez v. Unit-
ed States, 655 E3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Orocio, 645 E3d 630 (3d Cir.
2011).
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of the "lack of unanimity" and the "array of views" among the justices.
Because a majority of lower courts had found that criminal defense law-
yers needed only to explain direct consequences of a plea but not
"collateral consequences," such as the risk of deportation, the Seventh
Circuit held that Padilla effectively changed the law.8 Thus, it announced
a new rule. Similarly, in Orocio, the Tenth Circuit held that Padilla was a
new rule because before that case, "most state and federal courts had con-
sidered the failure to advise a client of potential collateral consequences of
a conviction to be outside the requirements of the Sixth Amendment." 5
The court held that the concurrences and dissents in the seven-to-two
Padilla decision demonstrated that reasonable jurists could disagree about
whether Padilla was compelled.
In Chang Hong, the Tenth Circuit held that "Padilla is a new rule of
constitutional law, [and] it does not apply retroactively to cases on collat-
eral review." 7 The court looked to Teague's three-step process to
determine whether Padilla should apply retroactively: first, was the peti-
tioner's conviction final before Padilla was decided? Second, was the
Padilla rule "new"? And third, if new, did the rule fall into one of the ex-
ceptions to retroactivity?8 8 The holding of non-retroactivity here turns on
the analysis of prong two: whether the Supreme Court in Padilla an-
nounced a new rule or simply conducted a straightforward application of
Strickland's ineffective assistance of counsel test."9 The formula for finding
whether a rule is new or old is somewhat imprecise, the Chang Hong
Court acknowledged, as it has been stated in a number of ways.90 When
an old rule is expressly overruled, it creates a new rule per se.9' But when
not overruling an old rule, a rule can be new "within the meaning of
Teague 'if it 'breaks new ground," imposes a new obligation on the States
or the Federal Government,' or was not 'dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final."'92
The Third Circuit took the opposite view of the Tenth and Seventh
Circuits; it held that Padilla simply "clarified the law" and followed from
Strickland's clearly established rules on ineffective assistance of counsel
83. Chaidez, 655 F3d at 689.
84. Id. at 690 (citing Comnonwealth v. Clarke, 949 N.E.2d 892, 898 (Mass. 2011)
for the proposition that nine circuits had previously held that failing to advise a noncitizen
client of automatic deportation was not ineffective assistance of counsel).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 689.
87. Chang Hong, 671 E3d at 1148.
88. Id. at 1150-51.
89. Id. at 1154.
90. Id. at 1153.
91. Id. at 1154.
92. Id. at 1153 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (emphasis in orig-
inal)).
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claims. 93 The Third Circuit also found that Padilla did not "break new
ground" because the prevailing professional norm among attorneys at
the time was to advise noncitizens of their immigration consequences.
Although this is a reasonable view that has been adopted by several lower
courts,95 we have seen that the Teague standard is very restrictive when it
comes to determining whether rules are old or new.96 This level of re-
striction in combination with the retroactivity analysis used in past
Supreme Court cases makes it unlikely for the Supreme Court to take the
Third Circuit's path.
It follows from the line of reasoning employed in other retroactivity
cases since Teague that the present Supreme Court will probably consider
Padilla to be a new rule. For example, in Butler v. McKeller,17 the Supreme
Court considered whether the rule announced by Arizona v. Roberson"
should be considered new or old for purposes of retroactivity. In Roberson,
the Court had found that the rule they announced followed directly from
at least three prior decisions, including the famous Miranda v. Arizona.99 Yet
even though the Roberson Court had found that the rule followed as a
logical extension of prior rules, the Butler Court said that "the fact that a
court says that its decision is within the 'logical compass' of an earlier de-
cision, or indeed that it is 'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive
for purposes of deciding whether the current decision is a 'new rule' un-
der Teague."o The Court held that under the first exception of Teague, the
Roberson rule was new; it was more than just an application of an estab-
lished rule to new facts and so could not apply retroactively.' Similar to
Butler's application of Roberson to new facts, the Padilla majority and con-
currence agreed that Mr. Padilla's claim was governed by the old rule of
93. United States v. Orocio, 645 E3d 630, 639 (3d Cir. 2011).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., McNeill v. United States, No. A-11-CA-495 SS, 2012 WL 369471, at *3
(WD.Tex. Feb. 2, 2012) (finding Padilla retroactive and noting that all other courts in the
circuit had thus far found the same, also because Padilla was a poseconviction case that
applied its own rule); Campos v. State, 798 N.W2d 565, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (find-
ing that Padilla did not announce a new rule because Padilla itself was a postconviction
proceeding and because it was a variation of Strickland).
96. See, for example, the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit noting that "Teague is a
remarkably restrictive doctrine, and its second exception exceedingly narrow." Howard v.
United States, 374 F3d 1068, 1079 (11th Cir. 2004).
97. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
98. 486 U.S. 675 (1988). The rule announced was that after a suspect invokes his
right to counsel in relation to a specific crime, he is not to be interrogated about any
crime until counsel is provided.
99. Id. at 684 ("That a suspect's request for counsel should apply to any questions
the police wish to pose follows, we think, not only from Edwards and Miranda, but also
from a case decided the same day as Barrett [Colorado v. Spring].").
100. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415.
101. Id.
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Strickland.102 If the Supreme Court follows its Butler logic in analyzing
Padilla claims when it decides Chaidez, it will likely find that the rule is
new because it seems to be simply an application of an old rule to new
facts. Thus, analysis of whether the first exception to nonretroactivity un-
der Teague applies probably will result in a finding of a new, nonretroactive
rule.
The Court could still choose to apply Padilla retroactively under the
second Teague exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure. How-
ever, it is even more unlikely that the Supreme Court will find that Padilla
fits the second exception. The only rule thus far to be considered "water-
shed" is Gideon v. Wainwright, as mentioned above.'0 o The Court has held
that a rule "more limited in scope" than Gideon with less bearing on "ac-
curacy of the factfinding" fails to be watershed.'0 4 Again taking the Court's
analysis in Butler as an example, it is unlikely that Padilla will be a "water-
shed" rule. In Butler, the Court found that the Roberson rule, while it had a
large potential impact on police investigatory procedures, was not "central
to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt" and thus could not
be a "watershed" rule.'05 In considering whether Padilla meets the "water-
shed" threshold, the Court is likely to find that the "rule, while certainly
important, is not in the same category with Gideon, which effected a pro-
found and 'sweeping' change" in criminal justice procedures that directly
affect the determination of innocence or guilt.1o' Even where procedures
help protect a defendant's rights, like the Roberson rule, unless they are
equivalent to the guarantee of counsel, they will not meet this second
exception. Conceding that the Supreme Court is likely to find that Padilla
is a new rule for purposes of retroactivity, this Note turns to state post-
conviction review as a more likely ground for relief.
E. State Retroactivity Doctrine: Danforth v. Minnesota
Because states do not have to follow Teague per Danforth v. Minnesota,
state retroactivity doctrine has the flexibility to allow a broader redress to
defendants on postconviction review. In Danforth, the Supreme Court
considered the question of whether Teague controlled the relief that states
could provide on their own postconviction proceedings as well as what
federal courts could provide on habeas.' In that case, both the Minnesota
trial court and the appeals court employed Teague to determine that a
102. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
103. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 407 (2007) ("Gideon v Wainwright
[is] the only case that this Court has identified as qualifying under this exception.
(internal citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. Butler, 494 U.S. at 416 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989)).
106. Whzorton, 549 U.S. at 408 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 418 (2004)).
107. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 264 (2007).
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new rule for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal
cases could not apply retroactively."' The Minnesota Supreme Court con-
sidered, among other theories, the argument that the state was free to
apply a broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague.'09 It ultimately
concluded that they were constrained to the federal standard and could
not apply the new rules retroactively."o The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether Teague or any other federal law would
prohibit a state court from applying a Supreme Court rule of criminal
procedure on state postconviction review even where such rule would be
barred from retroactive application on federal habeas."'
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that Teague "does not
in any way limit the authority of a state court" to provide a remedy that
would otherwise be unavailable under Teague's nonretroactivity presump-
tion."2 The Court held that Teague set neither explicit nor implicit
constraints on the states from providing remedies on postconviction re-
view that are broader than what would be available on federal habeas."3
The Court noted that the Teague opinion purported to tailor its rule to
"the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on
whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction
proceedings." 4 justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Teague was in-
terpreted by the Danforth Court to be an interpretation of the federal
habeas statute and to be justified by considerations of federalism, which
are relevant only on federal habeas."' On state postconviction, the Court
explained, the interest in uniformity of application does not outweigh
the authority of the states to make and enforce their own laws." 6 There-
fore, the Court held that states may provide remedy via retroactive
application of rules on postconviction review that would not be availa-
ble on federal habeas." 7
However, even before Danforth was announced, states were varied in
their retroactive applications of new rules."' For example, in evaluating
108. Id. at 268.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 267-68.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 282.
113. Id. at 275.
114. Id. at 277.
115. Id. at 278-79.
116. Id. at 280.
117. Id. at 282.
118. Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or "Redressability," After
Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitution-
al Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 Am. CRiu. L. REv. 1, 54 (2009).
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cases after Ring v. Arizona,"9 some state courts considered themselves
bound by Teague, while others did not. However, even among the group
applying Teague, there was disparity as to whether the Ring rule was pro-
spective or retroactive. 120 Those that did not follow Teague also came out
varying ways; Florida and Idaho declared Ring not retroactive, and Missouri
and Indiana the opposite."' The same split has already begun to occur in
states evaluating the retroactivity of Padilla.122 Some scholars suggest that to
avoid the issue of "selective prospectivity" in state courts that leads to dis-
parate results and to keep states invested in the development of the
retroactivity doctrine, states should adopt full retroactivity as the default
rule. 123
III. STATE COURTS SHOULD APPLY PADILIA To DEFENDANTS WHO WERE ON
DIRECT REVIEW WHEN THAT CASE WAS DECIDED
Because Padilla is most probably a "new" procedural rule and likely
will not apply on federal habeas, states should use their Danforth
flexibility to give defendants relief at the state level. For three reasons, this
Part argues that states should adopt the Padilla rule on state postconviction
proceedings for those defendants whose cases were pending on direct
appeal when Padilla was decided. First, Section III.A argues that applying
Padilla to such defendants is the best way to eliminate inequity between
similarly situated defendants. Second, Section III.B argues that applying
Padilla to such defendants is consistent with the underlying purposes of
habeas retroactivity doctrine. Finally, Section III.C argues that extending
Padilla to this limited class of defendants strikes the appropriate balance
between fairness and administrative concerns.
119. 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires states to
provide a trial by jury in capital prosecutions).
120. See, e.g., Bottosen v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 711 (Fla. 2002) (concurring opinion
in which the court found Ring not retroactive under Teague but noting that "Florida state
courts .. . are not bound by [the] precedent" of Teague); Head v. Hill, 587 S.E.2d 613, 619-
20 (Ga. 2003) (applying Teague in finding Ring not retroactive); State v. Whitfield, 107
S.W3d 253, 268-69 (Mo. 2003) (declining to use the Teague test and instead us-
ing Linkletter to find Ring did apply retroactively).
121. Lasch, supra note 118, at 55.
122. Compare People v. Gomez, 820 N.W2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
Padilla nonretroactive because of relevant Michigan precedent and established retroactivity
jurisprudence) with Denisyuk v. Maryland, 30 A.3d 914 (Md. 2011) (holding that Padilla
would apply retroactively to cases occurring after 1996 enactment of the Illegal Irnmigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act).
123. Lasch, supra note 118, at 52.
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A. Unfairness to Defendants in Majority Rule States
The current patchwork of state approaches to ineffective assistance
of counsel claims has created a situation in which similarly situated
defendants have vastly disparate opportunities to pursue relief for the
same type of constitutional violation. At present, defendants in most
states may not use the Padilla rule on direct review. 124 It is barred until
postconviction review.'12 In some states, however, defendants may raise an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Padilla while on direct
.126
review.
The ineffective assistance of counsel procedure in majority rule
states mirrors the rule in federal courts: a defendant may not bring an in-
effective assistance of counsel claim until postconviction proceedings.127
Federal courts prefer defendants to bring such claims on postconviction
review because the record normally is not sufficient to support such a
claim on direct review.12 8 Similar justifications exist at the state level. As an
Iowa court recently explained, "[ineffective assistance of counsel] claims
are generally preserved for postconviction proceedings unless there is a
satisfactory record upon which to draw a conclusion."I29 Similarly, a
New York court justified the rule by pointing to the need to develop
the record:"[d]efendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, includ-
ing his claim that counsel provided inappropriate advice to waive a jury,
are unreviewable on direct appeal because they involve matters outside
the record."'
Despite these justifications, the approach in majority rule states is
unfair and untenable. It locks noncitizen defendants in a catch-22: the
Padilla rule is "new" so it applies only on direct review, but noncitizen
defendants cannot use the Padilla rule on direct review because it is an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Defendants' inability to bring their
ineffective assistance of counsel claims until postconviction proceedings
means they likely lose the benefit of Padilla. Consider a defendant be-
124. Ryan C.Turk, Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Blues: Navigating the Muddy Waters of
Georgia Law After 2010 State Supreme Court Decisions, 45 GA. L. REV. 1199, 1209-11 (2011).
See also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, § 11.7(e).
125. This rule developed for a variety of reasons, including the desire not to inter-
rupt the appeals process with an evidentiary hearing. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31,
§ 11.7(e); see also Turk, supra note 124, at 1209-11.
126. Turk, supra note 124, at 1209-11.
127. Id.
128. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003) ("[A postconviction]
motion is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance. When an
ineffective assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court
must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or pre-
serving the claim and thus incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.").
129. State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W2d 844,848 (Iowa 2011).
130. People v. Bradford, 926 N.YS.2d 88 (N.Y App. Div. 2011).
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tween trial and his appeal when Padilla was decided. First, state proce-
dural rules bar him from bringing a claim on direct review, then
retroactivity rules bar him from bringing the claim in postconviction
proceedings. The defendant is caught in an unfair gap in coverage
unique to ineffective assistance claims."' This double roadblock arises
only because majority rule states prevent defendants from bringing such
claims on direct review.
Some states apply a more flexible approach toward ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims. They allow defendants to bring such claims on
direct appeal when the record is adequate, an exception to the general
rule prohibiting ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review132
In Florida, for example, one appellate court determined that "such a[n
ineffective assistance] claim is cognizable [even on direct review] when
the ineffectiveness is obvious on the face of the appellate record, the prej-
udice caused by the conduct is indisputable, and a tactical explanation for
the conduct is inconceivable."3 3
Still, the benefit of such exceptions is almost entirely illusory. De-
fendants in these states will struggle to bring Padilla claims on direct
review because the record will almost never be sufficient to support such
claims. Typically, the record does not contain information about what
specific advice counsel did or did not give. In order for the court to get
such information, a hearing at which both the client and lawyer testified
would be necessary.
Some might argue that differing state approaches to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims is merely federalism. States have all sorts of
different procedures that can change the outcome of factually similar cases
across states lines. In some states, for example, the direct review process is
normally complete within two years. In others, the process may last four
years due to variations in state criminal procedure and increased case vol-
137ume.
However, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Martinez v. Ryan
demonstrates that, while federalism concerns allow for varied criminal
131. See Lasch, supra note 118, at 48-49.
132. Appellate courts in Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, and Texas have all laid out
similar exceptions. See, e.g., Benitez-Saldana v. State, 67 So. 3d 320, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011); State v. Utter, 803 N.W2d 647 (Iowa 2011); State v. G.T.,Jr., 71 So. 3d 394 (La. Ct.
App. 2011); State v. Howard, 265 P3d 606 (Mont. 2011); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W3d 137
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
133. Benitez-Saldana, 67 So. 3d at 322.
134. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 500-01 (2003).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 501.
137. See, e.g., Criminal Procedure, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
LAw SCHOOL (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:14 PM), http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/crininal
procedure (stating that states have their own rules of criminal procedure that vary from
one another and from the federal rules).
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procedures, courts must handle ineffective assistance of counsel claims with
extra care.'" As the Court explained, the effective assistance of counsel at
trial is a "bedrock principle in our justice system."139 In Martinez, the
Court held that a federal court may hear a claim on habeas where there is
a procedural default in the initial state postconviction proceeding despite
permitted different procedures for ineffective assistance of counsel from
state to state.o4 0 The Court described the variation in states' ineffective
assistance of counsel procedures and declined to hold that they need all be
uniform."' Instead, the Court designed an "equitable ruling" that would
allow states to maintain variable procedures but still provide for further
redress on federal habeas regardless of what that procedure might be. 142
In addition, some will attempt to justify this inequity by arguing it is
a consequence of using "states as laboratories." However, this is an issue
beyond that classic school of thought because of the subject matter and
because it involves habeas relief, which is meant to control for inequi-
ties.1 3 The right to remain in the country is implicated as a result of the
interaction of federal immigration laws with the state policies in a way
that can lead to very harsh results.144 As discussed in Part I, removal from
the country is typically the most severe consequence a noncitizen faces
upon criminal conviction. In adjudicating the removal of criminal de-
fendants from the country, the federal Executive Office for Immigration
Review may not "go behind the record" to consider whether a nonciti-
zen had the chance to procedurally challenge his conviction because he
did not know he would be rendered deportable by his plea.14 1 Rather,
138. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316-17 (2012).
139. Id. at 1317.
140. Id. at 1320.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1319-20.
143. "States as laboratories" is the theory of federalism that each state has the author-
ity to implement different laws and policies. This view has been notably endorsed by
former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in several opinions. She most recently endorsed this
idea in her dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, when she stated: "One of federalism's
chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that'a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'" Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
(Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
144. See supra Introduction.
145. The immigration court must have used the categorical and modified categorical
approaches to determine whether a noncitizen has been convicted of an aggravated felony.
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). In the categorical approach, the immigra-
tion court compares the statute of conviction with the federal statute in the INA. In the
modified categorical approach, the immigration court compares the statute of conviction
and "judicially noticeable documents" such as a plea colloquy with the federal statute.
Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 E3d 702, 712 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Agui-
la-Montes de Oca, 655 E3d 915, 937 (9th Cir. 2011)). Although the immigration court
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immigration judges may only look at the criminal record to make their
determination.4 6
Finally, habeas relief is premised on the notion that justice should be
administered with an even hand by treating "similarly situated defendants"
equally.147 If the Court does not apply a new rule to all cases that were
pending on direct review, then an "actual inequity" results as only some of
many similarly situated defendants become the "chance beneficiary" of
the new rule.'" The Court has consistently held that such similarly situat-
ed defendants must "be entitled to invoke the new rule" on direct
review. 4 9 Those defendants who were on direct review at the time Padilla
came down face varied application of the Padilla rule on postconviction
review depending on their state's rules on whether the state permitted
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct review or only on post-
conviction review, and depending on their exact stage of direct review
when the rule was announced. To prevent this inequity, state courts
should apply Padilla retroactively to all defendants in this class.
B. Purposes of Habeas and Retroactivity
Applying Padilla to those on direct review when the case was decid-
ed is consistent with the broad purpose of habeas retroactivity doctrine.
Although there are several competing theories regarding the purpose of
habeas review, many scholars agree with Justice Harlan that the focus of
habeas adjudication is to consider grave constitutional violations rather
than the innocence of the petitioner.' The composition of the Court has
a significant impact on the ideological approach taken to habeas.' 5' As de-
scribed above, however, the Court has developed a body of retroactivity
law on habeas that comports with Justice Harlan's views.152 This doctrine
generally indicates that new rules apply retroactively on direct review but
not on postconviction review unless they meet one of the two Teague ex-
ceptions. '" As discussed, the Padilla rule is considered a new rule by
may conduct these analyses, it may not re-decide whether or not the respondent was actu-
ally guilty of the crime.
146. Robles-Urrea, 673 F.3d at 712 (quoting Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 E3d at 940).
147. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987); Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244,258 (1969).
148. United States v.Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982).
149. Id. at 545.
150. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 31, 5 28.2(d); Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of
Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WAsH. U.L.Q. 151, 152 (1994); Lasch, supra note 118, at 62.
151. See LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 31, § 28.2(d).
152. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (after describing the evolution of
the retroactivity doctrine, the Court stated, "we now adopt Justice Harlan's view of retro-
activity for cases on collateral review.").
153. See supra Part II.B.
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several U.S. Courts of Appeals, including the Chaidez Court.'4 Chaidez
was granted certiorari to be heard in the Fall 2012 term."5 Because the
Supreme Court is likely to agree that Padilla is a new rule, this Note as-
sumes that Padilla is a new rule for purposes of the retroactivity analysis. 5 6
Under Justice Harlan's reasoning, Padilla should be available on post-
conviction review to defendants who were on direct review when it was
announced because it is a new rule.5 7 The rationale for drawing the line
to permit at a least all those defendants whose cases were still pending on
direct appeal "at the time of the law-changing decision" to invoke the
new rule stems from the idea that a defendant's case should be judged
based on the laws that were in place at the time of the final conviction."
This can cut both ways: a defendant-friendly rule such as Padilla could be
announced while a defendant's case is on direct review, but so could a
decision that favors the prosecution." In theory, at the time a court is
making the determination of a final conviction of a defendant, it should
be aware of all applicable precedents. Thus, it makes sense to use those
precedents that were on the books at that time to evaluate any potential
violations on habeas.
While setting a general standard of nonretroactivity, Justice Harlan's
theory on retroactivity for postconviction proceedings should also permit
application of rules on habeas that were announced while a defendant was
on direct review. In Desist, the Court revisited their recent summary of
retroactivity rules from Stovall v. Denno6 while considering whether the
rule in Katz v. United States'6 1 should protect the petitioners from having
154. See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2011),
("Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law not because of what it applies-Strickland-but
because of where it applies-collateral immigration consequences of a plea bargain").
155. Chaidez v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
156. See supra Part II.D.
157. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,322 (1987) (quoting United States v.Johnson,
457 U.S. 537,545 (1982)).
158. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688-89 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
159. That is, a defendant could bring a procedural challenge on postconviction re-
view and a prosecution-friendly new rule could prevent him from prevailing even if that
rule came down after his conviction was final.
160. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967), modified by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989)).
The Court in Desist describes the Stovall criteria as "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of
the new standards." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
161. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects against war-
rantless searches or seizures of conversations via electronic recordings regardless of whether
there is a physical intrusion into the space). In Katz, the petitioner had been recorded
making phone calls from a telephone booth, with the recording device attached to the
exterior wall of the booth. The court ruled that this violated petitioner's right to privacy,
noting that "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351.
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their conversations in a hotel room recorded.162 In his analysis, Justice
Harlan explained why new procedural constitutional rules to apply on
habeas: "[T]he habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards
that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place." 6 3 That is,
new procedural rules upholding constitutional standards should also be
applied retroactively on habeas review if they were announced while the
defendant was on direct review, and typically they are.164 Because Padilla is
a new procedural rule, it should be available on postconviction review to
defendants who were on direct review when it came down. However, as
it is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a Padilla claim cannot be
brought until after a conviction is final, even for defendants who were on
direct at the time and should have been able to invoke it.'' This creates
unacceptable unfairness because of the severity of deportation for some
but not others as the result of this discrepancy.
C. Extending Relief to This Limited Class Strikes the Appropriate
Balance Between Fairness and Administrability
Despite competing concerns, the issue of deportation of criminal
noncitizens requires special consideration. It is an unduly harsh conse-
quence for noncitizens who have pled guilty to crimes making them
removable under the INA, and it is on the rise due to the Obama admin-
istration's prosecutorial discretion efforts and Secure Communities.16
Despite the seriousness of this punishment, there are various concerns
competing with the goal of mitigating needless deportations.This Section
considers issues of finality, disadvantage to the prosecution, and concerns
related to opening the floodgates. It ultimately concludes that, for this
class of defendants, Padilla's goals override these concerns.
1.Will Such Claims Significantly Disrupt Finality of Decisions?
One of the chief arguments against retroactive application of any
rule is the principle of finality: the general interest in leaving final
162. Desist, 394 U.S. at 244-46.
163. Id. at 263.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part II.
166. Secure Communities is a program through which state and local law enforcement
will coordinate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the FBI to cross-check
databases, ensuring that noncitizen defendants detained by state or local law enforcement get
referred to ICE and the FBI. This leads to the deportation of more noncitizens who other-
wise might not come to the attention of ICE. Secure Communities has been implemented
in fourteen states, and implementation in all states is intended by the end of 2013. See U.S.
Dep't of Homeland Security, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities,
ICE, available at http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities/ (last accessed Dec. 2, 2012).
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judgments in a state of repose, rather than upsetting the judgment and
starting anew.1 67 Since habeas corpus review is an avenue for relitigation,
this leads some to believe that it should be used sparingly or only for
certain types of issues." However, deportation is a serious enough con-
sequence to warrant overriding the concern of finality in some cases, in
particular those where the crime was not especially grave and removal
seems like a disproportionate punishment. As the New Mexico Court of
Appeals recently noted when holding that Padilla applies retroactively,
"the duty [to extend Padilla relief] is even more pressing in cases ...
where deportation was a near certainty for a relatively minor offense.0 69
In addition, the narrow language of the Padilla decision and the limitation
on the retroactive scope of the Padilla rule to those who were on direct
review when the case was decided keeps the number of potential litigants
low.
Some may worry that lack of notice of potential immigration con-
sequences for the significant number of convicted noncitizens currently
facing deportation might alone be enough to motivate a defendant to
bring a Padilla claim on postconviction review. Some defendants may
want to push through a shaky ineffective assistance of counsel claim be-
cause they would prefer any other punishment, including a longer prison
sentence, to deportation. For others, the risk of relitigation may dissuade
them from bringing non-meritorious claims. To bring the ineffective as-
sistance motion, a petitioner must have evidence that he was denied the
advice required by Padilla to his detriment and that there was prejudice as
a result."' Because the outcome of a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim means the conviction gets vacated and the case is remanded,
defendants would also want to be sure that they have a probable chance of
winning if they were to bring the case to trial. As the Court noted in
Padilla, "the fact that a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim re-
sults in undoing the plea bargain and reinstating the original charges
imposes an intrinsic disincentive to seeking plea withdrawal-taking back
the plea means giving up the benefit of the bargain and facing the original
charges once again." 7 1
However, for the class of defendants who would be able to benefit
from this retroactive application of Padilla, allowing them to proceed with
their claims would be a fair policy considering the gravity of deportation
167. Richard H. Fallon and Daniel M. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Con-
stitutional Remedies, 104 HAR. L. REv. 1731, 1815-16 (1991) (describing Justice Harlan's
and Professor Paul Mishkin's emphasis on the special interest of finality on habeas review).
168. See, e.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683 (1971) ("[The] interest in
finality might well lead to a decision to exclude completely certain legal issues ... [from]
collateral attacks.") (Harlan,J., dissenting).
169. State v. Ramirez, 278 P3d 569,570 (N.M. Ct.App. 2012).
170. Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
171. Chin, supra note 29, at 677.
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and the limited pool of eligible defendants. As discussed, deportation is an
extremely serious consequence of a conviction. Those who are removed
from the country often lose their families, homes, and livelihood. Some
scholars have criticized the limited availability of relief via retroactive ap-
plication of rules on habeas under Teague, arguing that particularly serious
penalties should be adjudicated with more leeway.172 For example, some
find it disturbing that the Court refuses to "relax Teague's strictures in cap-
ital cases" because "allegations of constitutional defects that may have led
to an unreliable imposition of a sentence of death require relaxation of
principles that generally favor finality."'7 Although deportation does not
rise to the level of severity of the death penalty, one might view this pun-
ishment as harsh enough to warrant an override of the finality principle
where there is a strong case to be made.
2.Will Extending This Relief Disadvantage the Prosecution?
Limiting the retroactive reach of Padilla will minimize any disad-
vantage faced by the prosecution if re-litigation of a case is required. A
worry that arises when a rule is extended retroactively is that guilty de-
fendants will escape prosecution. If people get a second bite at the apple
by withdrawing their plea and going to trial, then some immigrants who
have actually committed crimes could be acquitted on the second go-
round. Full retroactive application of Padilla could mean cases from crimes
that happened a long time ago would be re-tried. This disadvantages the
prosecution, as it will have a more difficult time gathering evidence and
witnesses for a trial after many years have passed. From a public policy
perspective, we want to minimize the risk that guilty people will escape
punishment altogether.
While these concerns are legitimate, limiting the retroactive applica-
tion of Padilla as this Note advocates minimizes these issues. Padilla was
decided in 2010, which means only cases that were already on direct re-
view in 2010 (or that have happened since then) could be re-litigated
after a successful Padilla claim. Although this could mean a number of
years have passed since the actual events occurred, this limited class at least
creates a finite reach into the past. Those noncitizens convicted of crimes
five, ten, or twenty years ago will not be bringing Padilla claims because
the retroactivity of the rule does not extend to them. Thus, the prosecu-
tion's disadvantage will be minimal and the group of defendants getting a
second shot will be those that are within the limited class and have meri-
torious cases.
172. Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 167, at 1817.
173. Id.
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3. Floodgates:Will the System Be Overwhelmed
with Padilla Claims?
A third concern with extending retroactive application of Padilla is
that a large group of criminal defendants will come rushing forward with
claims, overburden the court, and open up the opportunity for overturn-
ing convictions that should have remained in repose. As discussed above, it
is unlikely that there will be an unmanageable number of convicted
noncitizens that would come forward under this rule. As one scholar
pointed out, "the standards governing ineffective assistance of counsel
suggest that withdrawn pleas will be few in number."74 Although most in
the criminal justice system enter pleas and there is a recent focus on de-
porting criminal defendants,'7 1 the Strickland standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel will still be in place. This will limit the number of
defendants that attempt to invalidate their convictions under Padilla. In
addition, because this particular offense by counsel does not in itself
speak to the innocence or guilt of the defendant, one would likely not
risk bringing such a claim unless it would be possible to get a substan-
tially lower sentence or a conviction for a crime not mandating removal,
if possible.'76 Thus, limited retroactive application of Padilla should not
create an issue of floodgates but rather should promote equity for similar-
ly situated defendants across state lines.
CONCLUSION
Padilla v. Kentucky was a landmark decision in the overlapping worlds
of criminal law and immigration law. It has the potential to impact some
of the cases among the thousands of criminal noncitizens incarcerated
each year. In light of recent administrative decisions on the part of the
federal government to focus deportation efforts on convicted noncitizens,
the accurate evaluation of such cases is of heightened importance. How-
ever, because of the established retroactivity doctrines, especially Teague,
federal courts are unlikely to apply Padilla on federal habeas. Although
states can opt for a wider application of the rule on their own postconvic-
tion proceedings, a strong interest in finality and the impracticality of
174. Chin, supra note 29, at 677.
175. See supra Parts 1, II.
176. Chin, supra note 29, at 677; see also Vivian Chang, Where Do We Go From Here:
Plea Colloquy Warnings and Immigration Consequences Post-Padilla, 45 MIcH. J.L. REFORM
189, 191 (2012) (arguing that "Padilla's holding alone is not robust enough to safeguard the
interests of non-citizen defendants" because the holding is limited to requiring only clear
advice or a blanket warning, which is a very limited protection in practice); cf Robert R.
Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007) (suggesting that Strickland's standard may
now have more bite in general as a result ofABA regulations).
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opening the door to Padilla claims from noncitizens convicted many years
ago makes courts unlikely to be willing to allow Padilla to apply retroac-
tively to any convicted noncitizen. Extending the benefit of the rule to
the limited class of noncitizens who were on direct review when Padilla
came down remedies the disparity regarding when an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim can be brought between defendants in minority
and majority rule states. This allows similarly situated defendants to be
treated similarly, promoting equity without opening the floodgates.
Going forward, the reality is that few convicted noncitizens will be
able to use the Padilla holding on postconviction review if their convic-
tions were final before Padilla was announced. However, those noncitizens
who have been charged and will be charged with crimes after Padilla and
going forward will be able to employ the rule on both federal habeas and
state postconviction review in the future. The Padilla rule is a fairly simple
mandate: defense attorneys must tell their clients of the potential for spe-
cific adverse immigration consequences if the law is clear. If it is not clear,
they merely must warn of the potential for deportation, without more.
Thus, the true effect of Padilla "will likely be primarily about the training,
practices, and norms of defense attorneys rather than about litigating fail-
ure to comply with it."77 Defense attorneys will be careful to inquire
about their clients' immigration status and to give at least a perfunctory
warning about immigration consequences, perhaps linking their client to
an mnigration attorney if possible. This rule may seem to have a narrow
effect, given that many attorneys already did advise their noncitizen cli-
ents in this way before Padilla and that few defendants are realistically
willing to risk trial rather than entering a plea when the evidence is
stacked against them. However, for that band of noncitizens with a genu-
ine chance that litigating their case would lead to acquittal and thus
prevent deportation, this rule is a critical protection. Extending Padilla to
application on state postconviction review for those defendants who were
on direct review when it came down is a fair rule that operates within the
legal constraints already in place in our system.
Of all the forms of punishment that follow from criminal convic-
tions, deportation is a particularly severe consequence. Because federal
courts are unlikely to be able to use Padilla on federal habeas due to
Teague and Greene, state courts should allow Padilla on postconviction re-
view in order to reduce the number of unnecessary deportations that
result from ineffective assistance of counsel. Protection against deportation
for noncitizen defendants should fall within the ambit of procedures that
merit exception to the nonretroactivity rule.
177. Chin, supra note 29, at 677.
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